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Editors’ Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY held its eighty-
ﬁfth conference in Washington, D.C., on April 10 and 11, 2008. For this
conference—our ﬁrst as editors of the journal—we selected papers on a
range of topics central to macroeconomics and economic policy: the rela-
tionship between economic growth and people’s subjective well-being; the
effect of international trade on wages; the appropriate role of policies
designed to strengthen local economies; macroeconomic crises and asset
pricing; the impact of political constraints on the success of economic policy
reform; and the behavior of ﬁnancial markets during the approach of world
wars. This issue of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity presents the
six papers from the conference, comments by the formal discussants, and
synopses of the discussions of the papers by conference participants.
In the ﬁrst paper, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers examine the
effect of income on subjective well-being. More than thirty years ago,
Richard Easterlin compiled empirical evidence suggesting that an increase
in a country’s average income did not increase the average level of happi-
ness among its citizens. This “Easterlin paradox” cast doubt on the desir-
ability of public policy focused on increasing material standards of living.
However, Stevenson and Wolfers argue that the data available for assess-
ing the link between income and happiness were quite limited for many
years, and that the apparent lack of a robust link led some observers to
“confound the absence of evidence of such a link with evidence of its
absence.”
Today, data on income and self-reported satisfaction are available for a
broad array of countries at all levels of development over a number of
decades. Using an extensive collection of these new datasets, Stevenson
and Wolfers estimate that income has a signiﬁcant positive effect on
subjective well-being. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated income-
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income levels within countries at a point in time, and within countries as
their average income changes over time. In particular, the authors ﬁnd no
evidence of a satiation point beyond which higher income does not raise
well-being.
These results show that absolute levels of income have important ef-
fects on well-being. However, the authors acknowledge that relative in-
comes may matter as well: Because their estimates of the income-happiness
gradient are imprecise, one cannot rule out either that the within-country
effect of income is smaller than the cross-country effect (which might be
attributable to relative-income effects) or that these two effects are identi-
cal (which would speak against a role for relative income). The authors
also note one striking exception to the pattern they observe: Americans
have experienced virtually no increase in happiness during the past thirty-
ﬁve years despite ongoing increases in average income. 
In the second paper, Paul Krugman returns to a question that he and
others studied in the 1990s: How does international trade affect the wages
of less skilled workers in the United States? Textbook analysis predicts
that increased trade with countries that have large quantities of unskilled
labor should reduce the relative price of goods whose production uses
unskilled labor intensively, and that this reduction in relative price should
reduce the relative wages of less skilled workers in the United States. The
key question is whether this effect is quantitatively important, and the
answer given by several studies in the 1990s was that U.S. trade with
developing countries was having only a modest effect on U.S. income
inequality.
Krugman explains, however, that the magnitude and nature of trade
have changed considerably since these earlier estimates were made. Im-
ports from developing countries have roughly doubled as a share of U.S.
GDP since the early 1990s. Moreover, the developing countries that
account for most of the recent expansion in U.S. trade have substantially
lower wages, relative to U.S. wages, than did the developing countries that
were the focus of the previous literature. Therefore, the effect of trade on
income inequality is potentially much larger today.
Examining the data, Krugman documents a marked increase in imports
of products that are traditionally skill intensive, such as computers and
other electronic products, compared with products that are not skill inten-
sive, such as apparel. Taken at face value, this pattern would suggest that
trade is not tending to widen the U.S. income distribution. But Krugman
deems it quite unlikely that the surge in imports from low-wage countries
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that falling costs of doing business internationally have enabled develop-
ing countries to specialize in low-skill niches within generally high-skill
industries. Even so, Krugman concludes that the shifting pattern of inter-
national trade has probably been a fairly small factor in the widening of the
U.S. income distribution. 
In the third paper in this issue, Edward Glaeser and Joshua Gottlieb
examine the effect of government policies focused on local economies—
what they term “place-making policies.” They begin by presenting evi-
dence that regions in the United States are close to a spatial equilibrium, in
which higher wages in a geographic area tend to be offset by higher prices
and lower amenities. Under these conditions, shifting resources from
places with higher average incomes to places with lower average incomes
would shift land prices and other prices correspondingly; these shifts
would not enhance equity.
Glaeser and Gottlieb then document the concentration of economic
activity in densely populated clusters and the strong positive connection
between density and productivity. The existence of such “agglomeration
economies” creates a potential justiﬁcation for government intervention. If
policymakers could identify the areas where additional density would have
the largest effect on productivity, encouraging growth there would be use-
ful. Unfortunately, identifying such areas is very difﬁcult; for example, the
authors ﬁnd little evidence that agglomeration economies are more impor-
tant for smaller cities than for larger cities, or for more compact cities than
for less compact cities. Similarly, concentrations of educated people seem
to generate an extra boost to average productivity. These positive
spillovers imply that local leaders should aim to attract or train more
skilled residents. Yet any effort by national leaders to induce skilled
people to move from one place to another would be useful for the country
as a whole only if analysts knew where the beneﬁts from additional skills
were the highest, and that is not known.
In addition, the authors contend that investment in transportation infra-
structure should be geared not toward making certain areas more desirable
relative to others, but instead toward generating the largest direct beneﬁt
for households where they currently live. They also encourage more build-
ing in high-income areas that currently restrict new construction through
tight controls on land use.
The fourth paper, by Robert Barro and José Ursúa, examines macro-
economic crises around the world since 1870. The authors build on the
long-term international data on aggregate output compiled by Angus Mad-
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responding measures of aggregate consumer spending. Barro and Ursúa
argue that Maddison’s data, although a valuable resource for economists,
contain a number of problematic observations. Some of these problems
arise from the assumptions used by Maddison to ﬁll in for missing data,
especially during periods of crisis; others stem from inadequacies of the
raw source data that can be surmounted by using alternative sources,
including recent projects in some countries to develop national accounts
for longer periods. Barro and Ursúa also point out that data on consump-
tion are an important complement to data on output for various analytical
purposes, including the study of asset pricing. Moreover, the dynamics of
consumption can vary sharply from the dynamics of output, especially in
wartime, when government outlays typically expand while consumption is
often restricted.
Altogether, the paper presents nearly full annual data on GDP for thirty-
six countries and on aggregate consumption for twenty-four. Deﬁning a
“crisis” as a decline of at least 10 percent, the paper identiﬁes 152 crises
for GDP and 95 for consumption. The average crisis lasts about 3
1⁄2 years
and represents a decline of more than 20 percent. Crises in GDP and con-
sumption generally occur together, with the proportional decline in con-
sumption similar to that in output during nonwar crises but larger during
wartime crises.
Barro and Ursúa use these data to determine whether the frequency and
magnitude of economic disasters justify, for a reasonable assumption of
the degree of aversion to risk, the observed premium in returns on equities
relative to safer assets. They conclude that the observed average premium
of roughly 7 percent on leveraged equity can be justiﬁed by a coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion of 3.5, which they deem to be reasonable. This result
is robust to various changes in speciﬁcation with one exception, namely,
when the sample is limited to nonwar crises, which eliminates most of the
largest declines in consumption.
In the ﬁfth paper, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Pablo Querubín,
and James Robinson confront the question of why economic policy
reforms recommended by analysts sometimes succeed and sometimes fail.
A range of reforms urged on developing countries in recent decades—
including the opening of markets to trade, ﬁnancial liberalization, privati-
zation of state enterprises, and central bank independence—often have
improved economic performance by less than many advocates predicted.
One possible explanation, the authors note, is that the reforms were mis-
guided, at least when applied to countries at certain stages of development.
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nomic performance is frequently the political economy of the nation
attempting the reform.
Acemoglu and his coauthors argue that determining whether policy
reforms will be effective requires understanding why inappropriate poli-
cies are being pursued in the ﬁrst place. They develop a model in which
policy distortions arise from a political equilibrium. In this situation, the
beneﬁcial effects of distortion-reducing reforms may be offset by the
efforts of politically powerful people to recoup losses they suffer when 
the distortions are reduced. Given the assumptions of this model, policy
reform is less likely to be effective in two opposite sets of circumstances:
when constraints on political ofﬁceholders are so weak that any reform is
likely to be undermined, and when the constraints are so strong that policy
is not very distortionary initially.
The paper also presents some empirical evidence on one speciﬁc type of
reform, central bank independence, that the authors view as consistent
with these theoretical predictions. Their data suggest that reforms that
increase central bank independence reduce inﬂation more in countries
where policymakers face intermediate constraints on their power than in
countries where policymakers face strong or weak constraints.
The ﬁnal paper in this issue is an examination by Niall Ferguson of the
behavior of ﬁnancial markets during the periods surrounding world wars.
Ferguson, a historian, begins by observing that despite military interven-
tions and terrorist actions and threats, ﬁnancial markets in this decade have
evinced little concern about international political risks. While acknowl-
edging that current geopolitical risks appear smaller than those preceding
the major world conﬂicts of the last century, Ferguson contends that
threats from the Middle East and Asia and from terrorists around the world
have the potential to inﬂict great harm on Americans and on American
property. Moreover, events of the past century showed clearly that interna-
tional political crises can have profound effects on ﬁnancial markets.
Ferguson then reviews the performance of different asset classes around
the time of the First World War, the Second World War, and two episodes
during the Cold War. He demonstrates that investors did not anticipate the
First World War or the effects of the liquidity crisis it caused, but also that
asset prices moved very differently in the Second World War, so that
investors could not protect their wealth by studying the ﬁnancial effects of
previous crises. As he notes, the chief challenges for investors in learning
from the experience of a major war are that such wars are infrequent, and
that military and economic paradigms often change dramatically between
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geopolitical risks in recent decades, and he views this evolution as similar
to what occurred in the decades between 1880 and 1914. As a result, a
major conﬂict today would hit ﬁnancial markets “like a bolt from the
blue.”
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